New Zealand has been increasingly bent on asserting a place in the United States-led ranks opposing China in the Asia-Pacific region, following in the footprints of Australia.

In recent decades, New Zealand has cultivated a sense of pride in its "independent foreign policy".The genesis of this stance can be traced back to the 1980s, when the US, in response to the Fourth Labour Government of New Zealand's nuclear-free policy, suspended its obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.

Wellington's decision charted a path distinct from US interests, fostering a sentiment of self-reliance and autonomy on the global stage.

The legacy of this history continued to resonate up till now, shaping New Zealand's approach, and it asserted its identity as a nation defining its course on its own terms. With the demise of the Cold War era, New Zealand adeptly harnessed emerging opportunities, spanning from Beijing to Cape Town, for three fruitful decades.

However, despite hesitation and unwillingness, the island country's pivot from neutrality against China has become apparent as it contemplates joining the AUKUS security alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. As revealed by a torrent of strategic blueprints, the country's defense policy is undergoing a perilous overhaul.

The catalyst for this stance lies in three strategy documents unveiled and accelerated by Andrew Little, the minister of defense, in Parliament recently. These are New Zealand's inaugural National Security Strategy, the military-focused Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, and the Future Force Design Principles, a document that hints at the long-term plan for the reconfiguration of the country's military power.

The National Security Strategy lays the foundation for New Zealand's approach to safeguarding its strategic interests. Overall, these policy documents mark an unprecedented shake-up in New Zealand's foreign and defense policies, for a drastic and risky metamorphosis spearheaded by a belligerent approach toward reevaluating the country's military capabilities.

At the core of the new Defence Policy and Strategy Statement lies an intent to attain "combat-capable" status and extend its military engagements in the Pacific region. The text conspicuously emphasizes the imperative of bolstering combat and military capabilities. Additionally, acquiring advanced military hardware is another crucial aspect of this ambitious endeavor, which further suits the demands of the US military-industrial complex.

With China's name appearing over a dozen times, the blueprint identifies Beijing as the primary target of New Zealand's strategic overhaul. This aggressive stance reflects New Zealand's attempt to tackle the "presumed challenges "posed by "China's growing presence" in the Pacific region.

According to the National Security Strategy, "China's rise is a major driver of geopolitical change." And the authors use a slogan of the US and Australia in accusing Beijing of "economic coercion", totally disregarding US sanctions.

This Security Strategy theme marks a significant departure for Wellington. New Zealand has traditionally maintained amicable ties with Beijing amid the worsening relations between China and the US-led West. However, the language and essence of the documents suggest a drastic and unprecedented shift in the country's approach toward China.

However, signs now suggest that this prosperous era of geopolitical choreography is coming to a close, prompting Wellington to shelve its "independent foreign policy" for the lure of US-led alliances. As a result, New Zealand has participated in NATO summits last year and this year.

While Wellington embarks on a confrontational and risky trajectory, the world is watching with intrigue to witness the ramifications of this generational shift in the country's global outlook.

This shift toward a more assertive Western-styled foreign policy position is perilous, especially given China's status as New Zealand's largest trading partner, accounting for over a quarter of its annual exports.

Another disturbing point of concern in the latest road map is the potential for New Zealand to enter "Pillar Two" of the AUKUS alliance. Notably, the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement cryptically hints at this possibility, highlighting the chance for cooperation on emerging technologies with close security partners.

Until now, New Zealand's hesitance toward AUKUS stemmed from its nuclear dimension, conflicting with the country's nuclear-free policy, and its desire to maintain the essence of its independent foreign policy. The recent shift in defense policy has sparked a fierce tug of war within the ranks of the Labour government over the AUKUS issue.

Obviously, with the parliamentary election approaching in October, the final decision will fall to the next government.

New Zealand should consider an alternative course, aligning with its tradition of independent foreign policy. Embracing a role focusing on de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy could serve as a constructive approach, instead of fueling geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region by adopting an anti-China approach.

The author is an international affairs commentator and freelancer based in Karachi, Pakistan. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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