WORLD> America
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WORLD> America
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Insurance giant AIG's role in market crisis probed
(Agencies)
Updated: 2008-10-08 09:54 Sullivan and Willumstad, in turn, cast much of the blame on accounting rules that forced AIG to take tens of billions of dollars in losses stemming from exposure to toxic mortgage-related securities. Sullivan also came under fire for reassuring shareholders about the health of the company last December, just days after its auditor, Pricewaterhouse Cooper, warned of him that AIG was displaying "material weakness" in its huge exposure to potential losses from insuring mortgage-related securities. AIG's problems did not come from its traditional insurance subsidiaries, which remain healthy, but instead from its financial services operations, primarily its insurance of mortgage-backed securities and other risky debt against default. Government officials feared a panic might occur if AIG couldn't make good on its promise to cover losses on the securities; investors feared the consequences would pose a threat to the US financial system, which led to the government bailout. AIG suffered huge losses when its credit rating was cut, thanks largely to complex financial transactions known as "credit default swaps." AIG was a major seller of the swaps, which are a form of insurance, though they are not regulated that way. The swap contracts promise payment to investors in mortgage bonds in the event of a default. AIG has been forced to raise billions of dollars in collateral to back up those guarantees. Sullivan said many of the firm's problems stemmed from "mark to market" accounting rules mandating that its positions guaranteeing troubled mortgage securities be carried as tens of billions of dollars in losses on its balance sheet. This in turn, said former AIG chief executive Willumstad, who ran the company for just three months after Sullivan left, forced the firm to raise billions of dollars in capital. The federal rescue came after AIG suffered disastrous liquidity problems after its credit rating was lowered, forcing the company to come up with even more capital. "AIG was caught in a vicious cycle," Willumstad said in the testimony. Greenberg said that AIG "wrote as many credit default swaps ... in the nine months following my departure as it had written in the entire previous seven years combined. Moreover, "unlike what had been true during my tenure, the majority of the credit default swaps that AIGFP wrote in the nine months after I retired were reportedly exposed to subprime mortgages." But Sullivan said the complex swaps had underlying value, even as the market for them froze, sending their book value plummeting and forcing AIG to scramble for collateral. "When the credit markets seized up, like many other financial institutions, we were forced to mark our swap positions at fire-sale prices as if we owned the underlying bonds, even though we believed that our swap positions had value if held to maturity," Sullivan said. |
